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This paper empirically characterizes firm-level responses to a competitive
shock given by rising import competition from China. We use microdata on
the universe of Chile’s manufacturing firms during 1995-2006. For identification
we exploit the fact that Chinese import penetration (CIP) increased differently
over time across manufacturing industries. We use chinese export growth in
high-income industry-country pairs as instruments for CIP. Average CIP across
industries increased from 1.5% in 1995 to 10.1% in 2006. Our results suggest that
firms in industries more exposed to rising CIP dismiss more workers, reduce their
sales and face a higher probability of exiting the market relative to comparable
firms in less exposed industries. All these effects are less pronounced for more
productive firms.
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I Introduction
There is consensus in mainstream economics that globalization and trade
liberalization tend to improve long-term welfare by allowing the economy to reallocate
resources towards comparative advantage industries and to more productive firms even
within narrowly defined industries. We also know that this reallocation process is
likely to create short- and medium-term losses that are unevenly distributed across
regions, industries, firms and workers. A growing body of theoretical and empirical
literature studies the impact of trade liberalization on labor market outcomes, such as
rising unemployment, worsening income distribution and more recently, regional labor
market effects1.
The overcoming of the adjustment costs and the materialization of long-term
benefits will depend ultimately on the speed of the adjustment process, which might
be related to each economy’s productive structure, the characteristics of its labor force
and the nature of its institutions (e.g. protection networks, labor market flexibility and
policy responses). As globalization continues and deepens, the tension between workers
concerned with short-term outcomes and policy makers focused on long-term welfare
will enhance. In this context, understand which firms and industries are more sensitive
to foreign competition is important to measure the potential effects of globalization
on labor market results, evaluate the reallocation possibilities and design cost-effective
policy responses to speed up the adjustment process or compensate displaced workers.
Furthermore, the existing evidence in developing countries is quite scant and far from
being conclusive.
The endogeneous nature of trade make it difficult to asses the causal impact
of trade liberalization on firms and workers. The main challenges faced by this
literature are (i) the endogeneity of trade policy and (ii) the need for measures of
actual trade restrictiveness beyond traditional tariffs. Non-tariff barriers are widely
used by developing countries and (when measured) remain barely comparable across
countries/industries and over time. Recent contributions have partially adressed these
drawbacks by focusing instead on ex-post measures of trade such as the import
penetration ratio from low-wage countries (e.g. Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2006,
1For evidence on trade and local labor markets see Chiquiar 2008 (Mexico), Topalova 2010 (India),
Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013 (U.S.), Kovak 2013 and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak 2017 (Brazil). For
industry-level evidence see Goldberg and Pavcnik 2005 (Colombia), Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2006
(U.S.) and Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren 2010 (U.S.). Firm-level evidence is presented in Amiti
and Davis 2011 (Indonesia), Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch and Xiang 2014 (Denmark) and Bloom,
Draca and Van Reenen 2015 (Europe), among others.
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Khandelwal 2010).
The espectacular growth of China in the last decades provides a unique
opportunity to measure the causal effect of trade on relevant economic outcomes. Much
of China growth was driven by massive migration from rural to urban regions, strong
investments in infraestructure, genuine increases in total factor productivity and an
export-oriented strategy that placed China as one of the world’s leading producer of
manufactures2. The export growth explained by these and many other factors inherent
to Chinese economic forces and institutions provides a potencial exogenous shock to
the competitiveness of firms and workers from all over the world.
In this paper we empirically characterize firm- and industry-level responses to
competitive shocks given by rising import competition from China. To account for
the endogenous nature of trade we apply an instrumental variable strategy that have
also been used by other recent papers in the literature (e.g. Autor et al. 2013,
Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song 2014, Bloom et al. 2015 and Acemoglu et al. 2016).
We use microdata on the universe of Chile’s manufacturing firms during 1995-2006.
The panel structure of the data enable us to control for many unobserved potencial
confounders. For identification we exploit the fact that Chinese import penetration
(CIP) increased differently over time across manufacturing industries (see Figure I).
Average CIP across industries increased from 1.5% in 1995 to 10.1% in 2006. Textiles,
toys and machines/electrical sectors present the highest rates of exposure to Chinese
competition, while sectors like food, paper and chemicals remain barely exposed (see
Figure II).
During the studied period, the total number of workers employed in manufacturing
decreased until 2001 and fully recovered in 2006. Although, growth patterns across
industries differ substantially, being those more exposed to China competition the ones
that contracted the more and recovered the less. Industries with low-exposure were 18%
bigger in terms of total employment in 1995, while this gap increased to 96% in 20063
(see Figure III). While many potential factors could explain this divergent patterns,
2Many of these factors arised from market-oriented reforms that began in the 1980s. For evidence on
China’s economic transition see Naughton (1996), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Brandt et al. (2012)
and Hsieh and Ossa (2016), among others.
3Our sample works with 78 out of 111 industries, but results are robust to work with the entire
dataset (see Section II for data cleaning and Section V for robustness). Exposed (non-exposed)
industries are those above (below) median Chinese import penetration (CIP), which is equal to
0.42%. Exposed (non-exposed) industries had 132,415 (156,508) employees in 1995 and ended up
with 100,581 (197,139) in 2006. Overall, 14% of the labor force was employed in manufacturing in
1995 and this fraction reduced to 12.7% in 2006.
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our estimates predict that the trade-induced competive shock given by rising import
competition from China explains 34.37% of the employment contraction in exposed
industries.
FIGURE I
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Notes. Each point represents an industry-year combination. Industries are defined at 4 digits of the
ISIC Rev. 3. Chinese import penetration (CIP) measured as total value of imports divided by domestic
absorption (production minus net exports) and varies at industry-year level. Industries are grouped
into 10 broad manufacturing sectors and ordered from lowest to highest exposure to CIP. Each symbol
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China import penetration (%)
1995 2001 2006
Notes. Chinese import penetration measured as total value of imports from China divided by domestic
absorption (production minus net exports) and varies at industry-year level. Manufacturing industries
classified by ISIC Rev. 3 are grouped into 10 broad sectors. Each sector includes a set of similar
manufacturing industries (number of industries within each sector are in brackets): Food/tobacco
(14), Textile/apparel/leather (10), Wood/furniture (6), Paper/print (7), Chemical/petroleum (6),
Plastic/rubber/glass (4), Metal (7), Machines/electrical (13), Transportation (3), Toys/other (8).
Sources: INE-ENIA and UN-COMTRADE.
An easy way of thinking why trade could be associated with labor market
adjustments is to reason in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Countries have different
proportions of productive factors, and so do the goods that each country produces
and exports. If this is true, then China’s opening to trade represents an increase in
labor supply in the world economy and we would expect labor-intensive industries to
contract as Chinese import penetration grows. If we think in terms of recent models
of trade, the impact of globalization could be heterogeneous across firms even if they
belong to the same narrowly defined industry. Melitz 2003 model shows how exposure
to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market and will
simultaneously induce the less productive to exit. Conversely, we would expect import
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Notes. Exposed (non-exposed) industries are those above (below) percentile 50th of average Chinese
import penetration (CIP), which equals 0.4%. CIP measured as total value of imports from
China divided by domestic absorption (production minus net exports) and varies at industry-year
level. Industries defined at 4 digits ISIC Rev. 3. Sources: Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual
(ENIA) from Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) and Commodity Trade Statistics Database
(COMTRADE) from United Nations (UN).
The main dataset used throughout this paper is the Annual National Industrial
Survey (ENIA) realized by the Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (INE). It consists
on census yearly panel data on the universe of manufacturing firms with ten or more
employees. We count on this dataset from 1995 onwards and we chose to stop the
selected sample in 2006 in order to avoid potential counfunding effects arising from
the beggining of the global financial crisis in 2007, which severely affected global trade
patterns. The main module of the survey includes information on firm characteristics
such as total employment, revenue, investment, intermediate inputs, industry affiliation
and so on. We use this data in two ways. First, we construct the main economic
outcomes of interest for our analysis: employment, revenue and exit rates. Second,
we employ it to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) at firm-level, following the
method proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer 2015. This allows us to evaluate the
hypothesis that competitive shocks may have different effects across firms depending
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on their initial productivity levels.
We employ a secondary publicly available dataset from the United Nations
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN-COMTRADE). It contains yearly
information on import/export dollar-values, quantities, partners and product codes (at
6 digits of the Harmonized System international classification) reported by statistical
authorities of close to 200 countries and regions. By merging this dataset with the
firm-level Chilean information we are able to construct a measure of Chinese import
penetration (CIP) which varies by 4 digits industry-year level (International Standard
Industry Classification, Rev. 3). CIP is measured as the total value of imports
coming from China divided by domestic absorption (production minus net exports).
Importantly, we use this dataset to construct an instrumental variable for CIP given
by the average import industry shares across a subset of high-income countries (as in
Bernard et al. 2006, Autor et al. 2013 2014 and Bloom et al. 2015). This dataset
is also useful to describe the degree of competitive presure caused by Chinese import
penetration, as given by the average price differences of the products exported from
China and their pairs from the rest of the world.
We perform firm- and industry-level regressions. The baseline estimation equation
at firm-level regresses the three main outcome variables (firm total employment, firm
total revenue and firm’s exit rate) on CIP, including an extensive set of firm-level control
variables (e.g. TFP, K/L ratio, import/export status) plus year, firm, region-year and
sector-year fixed effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects enables us to control for
many unobserved time-invariant potential confounders (such as the ability of firms’
managers) and also for time-varying shocks affecting differently geographically distant
regions within the country or specific manufacturing sectors. Since CIP is endogenous
because industry shocks affecting the outcome variables could be correlated with
demand for imports, we instrument this variable with the average China’s industry
import shares across a sample of high income countries. This variable is aimed to
capture supply-driven shocks that made China gain market share across this economies
over time (e.g. increases in TFP). First-stage regression shows a strong predictive
power of the instrument, with a coefficient of 0.96 (0.13) and R-squared of 0.70.
The identifying assumptions are that: (i) China export growth is exogeneous (driven
by TFP, infraestructure, migration, etc.) and (ii) industry import demand shocks
are uncorrelated between Chile and this group of countries. We follow a similar
strategy for industry-level regressions. This specification will capture the net effect
of growing CIP on employment because of both the variation of firm-level employment
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(intensive margin) and the open/closure of new/existing firms (extensive margin)4.
These regressions are run mainly to motivate the discussion by showing more rigorously
the idea that Figure III roughly described: industries more exposed to growing CIP end
up being smaller in terms of total employment, revenue and number of active firms5.
The second set of firm-level regressions are aimed to capture the existence of
heterogenous effects of CIP on the aforementioned outcomes as a function of firm
total factor productivity (TFP), which is unobserved and presents two main estimation
challenges. First, input choices are correlated with firm-level productivity (not observed
by the econometrician) and will generate an endogeneity problem (simultaneity bias)
when using the classic OLS estimator. Second, firm-level datasets usually have a
considerable level of attrition, since firm exit is likely to be correlated with firm
productivity if firms have some knowledge of their future productivity prior to exiting
(selection bias)6. To estimate TFP we follow recent advances in the literature given
by the method proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer 2015. We use the estimated
firm-level TFP in two types of regressions. Initially, adding firms initial TFP interacted
with CIP in the main specifications. And then, estimating the baseline specification
separately for firms of different quintiles of the TFP sector distribution.
Our main results suggest that firms in industries more exposed to growing CIP
dismiss more workers, reduce their sales and face a higher probability of exiting the
market relative to comparable firms in less exposed industries. Specifically, an increase
in 1 p.p. of CIP reduces firm employment by 0.89%, reduces firm sales by 1.87% and
increases the firm’s probability of shut down by 0.65 p.p. Our estimates indicate that
the impact of CIP on employment, revenues and exit decrease in magnitude as firms
initial TFP is higher. The marginal effect of CIP on employment/revenue/exit for
a firm located at the 25th percentile of its sector TFP distribution is 2.69/1.66/2.12
times bigger than this marginal effect for a firm situated at the 75th percentile. Even
more, when we perform separate regressions for each quintile of the firm-level TFP
4We cannot account for general equilibrium effects with this identification strategy. We are unable
to capture indirect employment effects via input-output linkages between upstream/downstream
industries. Additionally, we would expect displaced workers of exposed industries to look for
employment in non-exposed industries (positive reallocation effects) and presume that other sectors
might also be influenced by a potentially negative Keynesian aggregate demand multiplier effect.
Recent papers focused on local labor markets explore these and other related questions (see for
example Autor et al. 2013, Acemoglu et al. 2016 and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak 2017).
5The same pattern noted in Figure III is seen if we graph total revenue and total number of firms
instead of total employment.
6For an excellent exposition on these topics we recommend the chapter of Ackerberg et al. 2007 in the
Handkook of Econometrics, and the seminal papers of Olley and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin
2003 and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer 2015.
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distribution, we find the same pattern that we noted with the interaction regressions:
effects decrease for firms that are more initially productive in their sectors of activity.
Even more, effects of CIP on firm employment and revenue are not statistically
significant for firms located in the highest quintile of within sector TFP distribution.
These results point out considerable heterogeneity across firms in the adjustment
costs to Chinese import competition. Firms with higher initial productivity levels were
better able to withstand this competitive shock. This is consistent with the idea that
more productive firms can escape competition from low-wage countries because they
produce higher quality products that do not compete directly with products imported
from these countries.
Our main contribution to the existing literature is empirical. Evidence for
developing countries is quite scant and far from being conclusive. Much of the evidence
for developed nations is not entirely transferable to small developing countries like
Chile. The relatively small size of the Chilean economy and its great trade openness
given her early liberalization episodes during the late 1970s and early 1980s augment
the credibility of our identification strategy. Much of the evidence for U.S. does not
complete isolate the fact that industry demand shocks might be correlated with industry
trade exposure given that U.S. demand represents and important share of Chinese
exports (20% on average during this period). Another contribution of this paper
is to reinforce the idea that competitive shocks may have heterogeneous effects on
firms according to their initial productivity levels. Our findings are especially relevant
for developing countries with visible problems of unemployment or missalocation
of productive factors, where an important share of the labor force is employed in
low-competitive sectors characterized by relatively high presence of low-productivity
firms.
The rest of the paper is oganized as follows. Section II presents the data and
discuss some descriptive statistics. We present a brief historical background of Chile
and China in Section III. Section IV discusses the estimation strategy. We analyze
all the empirical findings of the paper in Section V. We finish with some concluding
remarks in Section VI. Additional figures and tables are included in the Appendix.
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II Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we explain the main characteristics of the two datasets we combine
and the criteria used to clean the data. We then present some descriptive statistics
which may be important to consider when interpreting the main findings of the paper.
II.I Data
The firm-level panel data we use consists on the manufacturing yearly census
(Annual National Industrial Survey, ENIA) realized by the Chile’s National Institute
of Statistics (INE). It covers the universe of Chilean firms with ten or more employees.
We count on this dataset from 1995 onwards. We decided to stop the sample period in
2006 in order to avoid potential counfunding effects arising from the beggining of the
global financial crisis, which severely affected global trade patterns7. This dataset have
also been used by other papers such as Levinsohn 1999, Pavcnik 2002, Levinsohn and
Petrin 2003, among others.
The main module of the survey includes information on firm characteristics such as
the number of employees, expenditure on labor compensation, investment, intermediate
inputs, revenue, gross value of production, industry affiliation, region of activity and so
on. The main outcomes of interest for our analysis are employment, value of products
sold (revenue) and firm’s exit rate. Importantly, the information available enable us to
estimate total factor productivity (TFP) at firm-level following one of the most recent
advances in the literature of production function’s estimation. We follow the method
proposed by ackerberg15.
The international trade dataset is the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (UN-COMTRADE)8. It contains information on import/export dollar-values,
quantities, partners and product codes (at 6 digits of the Harmonized System
international classification) reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries
and regions. This dataset have also been used by many other related papers (e.g. Autor
et al. 2013 2014, Acemoglu et al. 2016, Amiti and Khandelwal 2013 and Hummels
et al. 2014). By merging this data with the firm-level Chilean information we are
able to construct a measure of Chinese import penetration (CIP) which varies by 4
digits industry-year level (International Standard Industry Classification, Rev. 3). CIP
7Unfortunately, we can not perform the analysis thereafter because the panel structure was
discontinued by the INE in the year 2008, alleging confidentiality issues regarding firms’ identifiers.
8This information is publicly available at https://comtrade.un.org/.
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where Qjt, Mjt and Xjt are the value of production, imports and exports for
industry j in year t, respectively9.
Additionally, we use this dataset in two ways. First, we construct instrumental
variables for CIPjt as the simple average of China’s industry import shares across c









where MChinajct is the total industry-year value of the imports coming from China in
country c, while MWorldjct is the total value of imports in industry j in year t in country c.
In order to capture supply-driven shocks inherent to the Chinese economy, we calculate
this industry-year index for a group of highly competitive industrial economies, as given
by the following high-income countries: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland10.
Importantly, we also use this data to capture the degree of competitive presure
caused by Chinese import penetration, given by the average price differences across
industries of the hs6-products imported from China and their hs6-pairs imported from
the rest of the world. Following standard practices in trade literature we use unit values
as proxy for prices.
In order to increase the quality of the data and avoid inconsistencies, we trim the
sample in some dimensions. First, we eliminate those firms that do not report complete
information about its input usage (labor, capital, intermediate inputs) and the value of
production. Second, we drop those firms that are present just in a single year or have
9Mjt and Xjt are obtained by aggregating product-level information from UN-COMTRADE data,
while Qjt is measured by adding up firm-level information from INE-ENIA.
10This group of high-income countries is the same used by Autor et al. 2014 and Acemoglu et al. 2016.
We test the robustness of our results to the use of alternative groups of countries (G7, OECD, Latin
America and Mercosur) and results do not change significantly.
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gaps in reporting. We need continuos information about production and inputs because
the estimation of TFP relies on the use of lagged variables as instruments (for details see
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer 2015). Finally, we choose to work with industries having at
least ten different firms over the sample period in order to avoid any bias resulting from
industries that are not representative of the Chilean manufacturing sector11. Overall,
the final sample represents two thirds of total manufacturing employment and two
thirds of total value of production.
II.II Descriptive Statistics
We present the two basic descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the
main variables of interest in our study in Table I. We present this statistics for all the
firms in the sample and separetely for firms that are in different quintiles of their sector
TFP distribution. The table shows a positive correlation between firm productivity and
number of workers, capital intensity and international trade participation, as we would
expect given previous findings in the literature (e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding and
Schott 2007 and Verhoogen 2008)12. The first three rows of this table show considerable
variation in our main outcome variables within firms of the same quintile and across
firms over different quintiles of sector TFP distribution.
On average, 7.5% of the firms shut down every year. As we would expect, exit
rates decrease with firm-level TFP. While 10.47% of the firms in the first quintile close
during an average year, this fraction diminishes to 5.47% for those firms in the fifth
quintile of sector TFP distribution. The average number of workers at firm-level is 76.
On average, firms in the fifth quintile are almost ten times bigger in terms of total
workers and have more than five times capital per worker than firms in the first quintile
(215 vs. 22 and 34,630 vs. 6,860 U.S.$, respectively). Only 5.79% (9.05%) of the least
productive firms exports (imports), while this fraction increases to 50.5% (48.3%) in
the most productive quintile.
11They represent 1% of total employment and 0,25% of total value of production. Our results remain
virtually unchanged if we include these industries in the analysis. For more details, see robustness
Section.
12The only exception is that K/L ratio is not increasing between quintiles one and two. Specifically,
this is due mainly to differences in machines and buildings. In the rest of variablese these firms are
relatively similar.
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All
Firms' exit rate (%) 10.47 7.71 6.99 6.85 5.47 7.50
(30.62) (26.67) (25.5) (25.26) (22.74) (26.34)
Revenues 164 331 668 2,221 16,928 4,061
(253) (502) (1,095) (7,039) (76,324) (34,881)
Employment 21.96 27.05 38.40 77.63 215.36 76.07
(29.9) (30.65) (38.41) (137.12) (273.73) (156.94)
Average wage 1.78 2.05 2.38 3.10 4.23 2.71
(1.29) (1.52) (1.5) (4.04) (3.78) (2.85)
K/L ratio 6.86 5.35 7.29 11.28 34.63 13.08
(42.42) (14.11) (43.58) (28.47) (168.85) (82.22)
Share exporting (%) 5.79 7.53 16.10 28.98 50.50 21.78
(23.36) (26.39) (36.75) (45.37) (50.) (41.27)
Share importing (%) 9.05 11.81 19.03 26.80 48.29 22.99
(28.69) (32.27) (39.25) (44.29) (49.97) (42.08)
N 8,860 8,874 8,872 8,874 8,866 44,346
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY QUINTIL OF TFP
Notes. Standard deviations in parenthesis. TFP is calculated by the method proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and
Frazer (2015) and normalized by average year-sector TFP. Quintiles constructed within 2 digits ISIC Rev. 3
industries. Exit =0 in active years and =1 one year before a firm leaves the panel. Revenues, wages and K/L
ratio measured in millons of chilean pesos of 1995. Exporting (importing) means exports (imports) >0. Average





After a period of state intervention and implementation of an import-substitution
policy regime during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Chilean military government carried
out a large set of market-oriented economic reforms throughout 1974-1979. As part of
the trade liberalization program, Chile eliminated most of its non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
and reduced significantly its tarrif barriers. While some tariffs exceeded 100% in 1974,
they were reduced to an ad valorem tariff of 10% five years later, a rate that was
uniform across industries. After some years of increased protection during the recession
of 1982-1984, when the uniform tariff increased up to 35%, it declined to 20% in 1985.
Even more, NTBs were not applied during this transitory period (see Levinsohn 1999
and Pavcnik 2002). All these reforms positioned Chile as one of the most trade oriented
economies of Latin America in the beginning of the 1990s13.
Another important aspect of the reforms focused on labor market regulations. The
government banned unions and replaced collective bargaining with a wage setting plan.
Although labor laws did not change, there was considerable de facto deregulation with
courts favoring firms’ dismissals. Since June 1978 firms were legally allowed to dismiss
workers for economic needs without any requirement on “just causes”. Besides some
changes in the compensation scheme, this reform still remains in practice. The new
Labor Code approved in 1979 replaced national unions with firm-level ones, workers’
rights to strike were curtailed and the costs of hiring/firing decreased significantly.
Chile underwent a new institutional change with the recovery of democracy in
1990. The same political coalition was in power during the period 1990-2010. These
governments kept a basic consensus on the critical role of the private sector and
markets deregulations to achieve efficiency, while pursuing poverty reduction and the
improvement of income distribution. In 1991 some few modifications were introduced
in the Labor Code, perhaps the most relevant was the increase in the limit for the wage
compensation of fired workers from 5 to 11 months of wage. Between 1998 and 2001
Chile experienced a macroeconomic turndown and there was an intense debate about
labor regulations. During this same time there was an increase in the minimum wage
of 30%. The new changes in labor laws were implemented in December 2001. While
13According to World Development Indicators from the World Bank, trade to GDP ratio for Chile was
61.75% in 1990 compared to an average ratio of 32.99% across Latin American countries.
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this reform increased the rights to collective bargaining, it also extended some margins
of flexibility related to hiring practices related to apprenticeships, part-time jobs and
temporal contracts.
The relatively small size of the Chilean economy, its great trade openness given her
early trade liberalization episodes during late 1970s and early 1980s and its flexible labor
market provide us with a nice scenario to study the causal impact of a trade competitive
shock given by the rising import penetration from one of the most competitive countries
in the world on firms behaviour.
III.II China
Beginning in the 1980s, China conducted a broad set of structural economic reforms
that transformed its agrarian structure into a modern industrialized economy and a
world leading producer of manufactures. The main trade reforms pursued a dualistic
regime characterized by import-substitution and export promotion policies (Naughton
1996). Not surprisingly, China exports to GDP ratio increased from 5.91% in 1980 to a
peak of 37.18% in 2006. The global financial crisis of 2007 severely affected global trade
patterns and China exports to GDP ratio experimented a downward reversal thereafter.
In order to avoid potential confounding effects arising from the global financial crisis
we decided to stop the analysis in 2006.
Much of China growth was driven by massive migration of workers from rural to
urban regions, strong investments in infraestructure, Chinese firm’s increasing access to
foreign technologies, intermediate inputs and capital goods, a massive inflow of foreign
direct investment and a stunning increase in total factor productivity. According
to Brandt, van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012), China had an average TFP growth
in manufacturing of 8.0% over the period 1998-2007. Along with these internal
reforms that promoted growth and trade was the country accession to the World Trade
Organization, which gave China the permanent most-favored nation status among the
WTO members on December 2001.
The export growth explained by the aforementioned factors inherent to Chinese
economic forces and institutions provides a potencial exogenous shock to the
competitiveness of firms and workers from all over the world. Particularly, given
that China is characterized by exporting labor-intensive low price products, the rising
import penetration of Chinese manufactures actually represents a competitive pressure
to domestic manufacturing firms. As we can see in Figure IV, products imported from
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China are on average cheaper than their pairs from the rest of the world in most of
the industries. Particularly, numbers in brackets show that products imported from
China are on average significantly cheaper than their pairs imported from the rest of
the world for all manufacturing sectors. For example, machines/electrical products
exported from China are on average 113% cheaper than their similars exported from
all other countries.
FIGURE IV
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Industries
Food/tobacco (-0.22) Textile/apparel/leather (-0.59)
Wood/furniture (-0.27) Paper/print (-0.48)
Chemical/petroleum (-0.43) Plastic/rubber/glass (-0.74)
Metal (-0.70) Machines/electrical (-1.13)
Transportation (-0.93) Toys/other (-0.70)
Notes. Estimated coefficients of separate regressions by industry of log price of imported varieties on
a China dummy (=1 if a product is imported from China and =0 if it is imported from any other
country) controlling for importing country-product-year fixed effects. In brackets we show the average
estimated coefficients across industries within broad sectors. Prices measured in constant U.S.$ unit
values. A variety is a product-exporting country combination. Products are defined at 6 digits of the
Harmonized System international classification. Industries defined at 4 digits ISIC Rev. 3. Sample is
restricted to top 50 importing countries in terms of total value of imports per year during the sample
period 1995-2006. Robust standard errors clustered by products. Source. UN-COMTRADE.
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IV Estimation
We perform firm- and industry-level regressions. The baseline estimation equation
at firm-level is the following:
Yijt = β0 + β1CIPjt +Xijt + αi + δt + εijt (3)
Where i, j and t index firms, industries and time, respectively; αi is a firm fixed
effect; δt is a time fixed effect and εijt is a mean-zero disturbance.
The main outcome variables Yijt are firm total employment (number of employees),
value of products sold (revenue) and firm’s exit rate. In the latter case, an observation
takes the value 1 in the year t if the firm shuts down in the following year t + 1,
and 0 otherwise. We include an extensive set of firm-level control variables (TFP,
capital intensity, import/export status). The main variable of interest is China
import penetration CIPjt, which varies by 4 digits industry-year level. In some
specificacions we also include region-year and sector-year fixed effects in order to
control for time-varying shocks affecting differently specific regions or sectors14. These
regressions exploit within sector (region) variation in CIP over time.
CIPjt is potentially endogenous because industry demand shocks affecting firm
and labor market outcomes are potentially correlated with demand for imports. To
account for this endogeneity concern we apply an instrumental variable strategy that
have also been used by other recent papers in the literature (e.g. Autor et al. 2013
2014, Acemoglu et al. 2016 and Bloom et al. 2015). We instrument CIPjt with the
simple average China’s industry import shares across a group of high-income countries:
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland15.
This instrument captures supply-driven shocks inherent to the Chinese economy that
allowed China to gain market share in some of the most competitive industrial countries
within specific industries over time. Then we estimate equation (3) by Two-Stages
Least Squares (2SLS). First-stage regression shows a strong predictive power of the
14We construct 10 broad sectors, where each sector includes a set of similar manufacturing
industries: Food/tobacco (14), Textile/apparel/leather (10), Wood/furniture (6), Paper/print
(7), Chemical/petroleum (6), Plastic/rubber/glass (4), Metal (7), Machines/electrical (13),
Transportation (3), Toys/other (8).
15This is the same group of countries used by Autor et al. (2013 2014). Although, we also tested the
robustness of our results to alternative groups of countries such as G7, OECD, Latin America and
Mercosur countries.
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instrument, with a coefficient of 0.96 (0.13) and R-squared of 0.70 (see Figure V). The
identifying assumptions are that: (i) China export growth is exogeneous (driven by TFP,
infraestructure, migration, etc.), and (ii) industry demand shocks affecting product





















0 20 40 60
Average Chinese industry share across High-income countries
95% CI Fitted values
Chinese import penetration
Notes. Each point represents an industry-year combination. The high-income countries used to
construct the average Chinese industry share are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland, which are the same group used by Autor et al. 2014. The 95%
confidence interval is based on std. errors clustered by two-digit industries (ISIC Rev. 3). The slope
coefficient is .96 with std. error .13, and the regression has an R-squared of .70. Sources: INE-ENIA
and UN-COMTRADE.
A potential threat to this identification strategy could arise if Chile’s industry
demand shocks are correlated with high-incomes’ ones. Given that Chile is very
different to these industrialized economies we expect this situation to be very unlikely.
Furthermore, the specifications that include sector-year fixed effects turn this situation
even more unlikely because these regressions would control for any contemporaneous
import demand shock affecting both Chile and this group of countries’ specific sectors.
One may think a situation where an income shock to consumers from all these countries
17
affects demand for Chinese imports. Time fixed effects will capture any shock evenly
distributed across industries. Even more, sector-year fixed effects will capture any shock
evenly distributed across industries within sectors. The only potential concern is the
existence of shocks unevenly distributed across specific industries within sectors that
are common to Chilean consumers and those in high-income countries. For example, a
common positive shock that increase demand in the textile sector will not be a problem.
Instead, if the common shock affects handbags and footwear differently there will be a
violation of our identifying assumption. Once again, we think the probability of shocks
correlated between Chile and high-income countries in very specific industries is quite
small.
The second set of firm-level regressions are aimed to capture the existence of
heterogenous effects of CIP on the main outcomes of interest, as a function of initial firm
total factor productivity (TFP), which is unobserved and presents two main estimation
challenges. First, input choices are correlated with firm level productivity (not observed
by the econometrician) and will generate an endogeneity problem (simultaneity bias)
when using the classic OLS estimator. Second, firm-level datasets usually have a
considerable level of attrition, since firm exit is likely to be correlated with firm
productivity if firms have some knowledge of their future productivity prior to exiting
(selection bias). To estimate TFP we follow recent advances in the literature given by
the method proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015).
We use the estimated firm-level TFP in two types of regressions. First, in the
main equation regression we add firm initial TFP interacted with CIP:
Yijt = β0 + β1CIPjt + β2CIPjt ∗ TFPij0 +Xijt + αi + δt + εijt (4)
Where TFPij0 refers to firm’s estimated TFP in the first year we observe each
firm, and the rest of the equation is the same as in (1). Estimated TFP is normalized by
2 digits industry-year averages16. The inclusion of initial TFP interaction with CIP is
key to capture heterogeneous firm-level response to the competitive shock. We decided
to fix TFP at firm initial level in order to avoid a potential confounding impact of CIP
on TFP. Another potential bias arise from new firms that begin to operate after the
initial year 1995. The entry rate in our sample is on average 8.3% per year. All our
16This normalization allows us to take into account relative differences in TFP for firms in the same
industry-year combination. Our results remain virtually unchanged without this normalization.
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results are robust to drop this subset of firms or use current instead of initial TFP.
Then we construct quintiles of the normalized TFP distribution and estimate the
baseline specification of equation (3) separately for each quintile. We construct quintiles
of firm-level average TFP over time within each 2 digits industries given that we want
to evaluate the existence of heterogeneous effects of CIP on firms belonging to narrowly
defined industries. Results are robust to construct quintiles that vary by year so firms
can scale up or down in the TFP distribution and to build quintiles within broad sectors
or with overall TFP distribution.
We follow a similar strategy for industry-level regressions. This regressions are run
just with motivational purposes, given that we can not control for the many unobserved
potencial confounders that we do with firm-level regressions. We estimate the following
regression equation:
Yjt = β0 + β1CIPjt +Xjt + αj + δt + εjt (5)
Where j and t index industries and time, respectively; αj is an industry fixed
effect, δt is a time fixed effect and εjt is a mean-zero disturbance. In this case, the main
outcome variables Yjt are total number of employees, total revenue and total number
of firms within each industry j over time t. We include industry-year controls (average
TFP, average capital intensity, share of firms importing/exporting). If we think in terms
of total employment, this specification will capture the net effect of growing CIP on
industry employment because of both the variation of firm-level employment (intensive
margin) and the open/closure of new/existing firms (extensive margin).
We cannot account for general equilibrium effects with this identification strategy.
For example, imagine a firm providing some service to a directly exposed manufacturing
firm. We would expect that part of the China shock also affects this firm’s demand for
services indirectly. Although, we are unable to capture indirect revenue/employment
effects via input-output linkages across upstream/downstream industries. Additionally,
we would expect displaced workers of exposed industries to look for employment in
non-exposed industries (positive reallocation effects) and presume that other sectors
might also be influenced by a potentially negative Keynesian aggregate demand
multiplier effect. Some recent papers find evidence in favor of this local labor market





Tables II, III and IV present baseline estimates of equation (3) for log total
employment, log total revenue and firm’s exit rate. In column (1) of each table we
present the OLS estimator with firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and a control
variable for import penetration from other countries different from China17. Then,
in column (2) we present the same specification but estimated by 2SLS. The 2SLS
estimate for CIP increases its magnitude in the three tables, which is consistent with
the existence of a positive correlation between Chile’s industry import demand shocks
and Chile’s industry labor demand and firm sales that biases the OLS estimate toward
zero. Columns (3) to (5) include firm-level control variables subsequently (TFP, K/L
ratio and importing/exporting status). All these control variables have the expected
signs. There is a correlation between the increase in firm’s TFP and: (i) rising demand
for workers (ii) increasing revenues (iii) lower probability of exit the market. The same
is valid for the importing and exporting conditions. Firms with increasing K/L ratios
have increasing revenues, decreasing demand for workers (by construction) and a higher
chance of exit the market. Given that we are including firm-level fixed effects, these
regressions capture correlations within firms over time. In this context, given that
employment is more mobile than capital we expect exiting firms to contract in terms
of workers before they leave the market.
Columns (6) and (7) include region-year fixed effects and sector-year fixed effects
to control for potential unobserved time-varying shocks affecting specific regions or
sectors. These regressions exploit within sector (region) variation in CIP over time. The
inclusion of sector-year fixed effects in column (7) increases significantly the magnitude
of the standard errors. This is explained for the fact that most CIP occurred at the level
of broad manufacturing sectors18. Although, the remaining variation across industries
over time within sectors is enough to capture the causal effect of the competitive shock
on firms’ responses.
All these additional controls in columns (3) through (7) do not affect either the
significance or the sign of the estimated CIP coefficient. Furthermore, the magnitude
17This variable varies at 4-digit ISIC Rev. 3 industry-year level and is constructed analogously to
Chinese import penetration described in Section II.
18A simple descriptive regression of CIP on sector-year dummies has an R-squared of 0.67.
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of the estimated coefficient presents little variation across 2SLS specifications19.
Our estimates indicate that an increase of 1 p.p. in Chinese import penetration
decreases firm total employment by 0.89%, reduces firm total revenue by 1.87%
and increases probability of firm’s exit by 0.65 p.p. To evaluate the economic
magnitude of these estimates we compare the observed firm-level employment with
the counterfactuals that would have ocurred in the absence of increasing CIP. The
counterfactual employment Lsimijt is given by:
Lsimijt = Lijt[1 + (1− exp(β̂L ∗∆CIPjt ∗R2IV ))] (6)
Where β̂L is the 2SLS coefficient estimate for CIP from equation (3) and ∆CIPjt
is within industry change in CIP over time adjusted by the partial R-squared from
the first-stage regression in order to capture the fraction of increasing CIP explained
by Chinese supply shock (as in Autor et al. 2013 and Acemoglu et al. 2016). In our
sample, exposed (non-exposed) industries had 132,415 (156,508) employees in 1995 and
ended up with 100,581 (197,139) in 200620. While many potential factors could explain
this divergent pattern, this counterfactual analysis predicts that had CIP not grown
over this period, overall employment contraction in exposed industries would have been
34.4% lower than the observed one. It is worth noting that this counterfactual is a
ceteris paribus partial-equilibrium analysis.
19The only exception is column (7) of table II. In this case, the magnitude of CIP estimate doubles
when we include sector-year fixed effects. This is consistent with time-varying sector shocks that are
positively correlated with firms’ revenues.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table V presents 2SLS estimates of equation (4) for log total employment (cols.
1-2), log total revenue (cols. 3-4) and firm’s exit rate (5-6). Control variables are the
same described in the previous subsection. The difference between even and uneven
columns is that the formers include region-year and sector-year fixed effects. In order to
test the existence of heterogeneous effects of CIP on our variables of interest equation
(4) includes an interaction term of CIP with firm level initial TFP. We decided to fix
TFP at firm initial level in order to avoid a potential confounding impact of CIP on
TFP.
Our estimates indicate that the impact of CIP on employment, revenues and exit
decreases in magnitude as firms initial TFP is higher. This can be seen by looking at
the estimated coefficient of the interaction term which has the opposite sign than the
main effect in all three cases. The marginal effect of CIP on employment/revenue/exit
for a firm located at the 25th percentile of its sector TFP distribution is 2.69/1.66/2.12
times bigger than this marginal effect for a firm situated at the 75th percentile. For
example, an increase in 1 p.p. of CIP reduces firm employment in 1.33% for a firm
located at the 25th percentile, while this effect is 0.47% for a firm situated at the 75th
percentile.
In Figures VI to VIII we show the CIP coefficient estimates from our baseline
regression equation (3) (specification in cols. 7 with full controls) when we run it
separately for each quintile of sector TFP distribution. These estimates show the same
pattern that we noted with the interaction regressions: effects decrease for firms that
are more productive in their sectors of activity. Even more, effects of CIP on firm
employment and revenue are not statistically significant for firms located in the highest
quintile of within sector TFP distribution.
We can interpret these results in a similar way as we did with interaction
regressions. The estimated coefficient of CIP on employment/revenue/exit for a firm in
the first quintile of its sector TFP distribution is 1.78/1.44/1.72 times bigger than the
estimated coefficient for a firm in the fourth quintile21. For example, an increase in 1
p.p. of CIP reduces firm employment in 1.21% for a firm in the first quintile, while the
effect is 0.68% for a firm in the fourth quintile.
21We use the fourth instead of the fifth quintile because estimated coefficients are not statistically
different from zero for employment and revenue.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
China import pen. -0.010*** -0.0090** -0.010*** -0.0189** 0.0045*** 0.0065***
(0.002) (0.0042) (0.003) (0.0083) (0.0010) (0.0016)
China IP x TFP0 0.013*** 0.0126*** 0.015*** 0.0138*** -0.0075*** -0.0069***
(0.004) (0.0041) (0.005) (0.0046) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Other import pen. -0.000 0.0001 -0.000 0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002)
TFP 0.087*** 0.0889*** 1.040*** 1.0473*** -0.0619*** -0.0602***
(0.016) (0.0154) (0.027) (0.0262) (0.0075) (0.0072)
Log(K/L ratio) -0.079*** -0.0842*** 0.095*** 0.0968*** 0.0102*** 0.0069**
(0.010) (0.0108) (0.006) (0.0055) (0.0035) (0.0032)
Importing 0.045*** 0.0416*** 0.090*** 0.0878*** -0.0176** -0.0190***
(0.013) (0.0118) (0.011) (0.0103) (0.0072) (0.0070)
Exporting 0.090*** 0.0894*** 0.104*** 0.0937*** -0.0229*** -0.0255***
(0.013) (0.0134) (0.015) (0.0146) (0.0077) (0.0071)
N 44,346 44,346 44,346 44,346 36,766 36,766
Firms 6,681 6,681 6,681 6,681 6,013 6,013
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region x Year FE - YES - YES - YES
Sector x Year FE - YES - YES - YES
TABLE V
ESTIMATES WITH TFP INTERACTIONS (2SLS)
Notes. Chinese import penetration measured as total value of imports from China divided by domestic absorption
(production minus net exports) and varies at industry-year level. This variable is instrumented with the average
Chinese industry import shares across a subset of high-income countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland). Industries defined at 4 digits ISIC Rev. 3. Other import pen. measured
as total value of non-China imports divided by domestic absorption. TFP measured following Ackerberg, Caves and
Frazer (2015). Importing (exporting) means exports (imports) >0. Regions are the country's first-level administrative
division. Industries are grouped into 10 broad manufacturing sectors. Robust standard errors clustered by industries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Log total employment Log total revenue Firm's exit rate
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FIGURE VI






























Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Quintiles (Total Factor Productivity (ACF))
Log of total employment
Notes. Estimated coefficientes and 95% confidence intervals obtained from five regressions that
relate log firm total employment to Chinese import penetration. Quintiles of TFP distribution are
constructed separately for each sector. Regressions include firm-level control variables (TFP, K/L ratio,
import/export status), time, year, region-year and sector-year fixed effects. The vector of controls is
the same used in column (7) of Table I. Robust standard errors clustered by industries.
FIGURE VII




























Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Quintiles (Total Factor Productivity (ACF))
Log of total revenue
Notes. Estimated coefficientes and 95% confidence intervals obtained from five regressions that
relate log firm total revenues to Chinese import penetration. Quintiles of TFP distribution are
constructed separately for each sector. Regressions include firm-level control variables (TFP, K/L ratio,
import/export status), time, year, region-year and sector-year fixed effects. The vector of controls is
the same used in column (7) of Table II. Robust standard errors clustered by industries.
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FIGURE VIII
























Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Quintiles (Total Factor Productivity (ACF))
Firm's exit rate
Notes. Estimated coefficientes and 95% confidence intervals obtained from five regressions that
relate firm’s exit probability to Chinese import penetration. Quintiles of TFP distribution are
constructed separately for each sector. Regressions include firm-level control variables (TFP, K/L ratio,
import/export status), time, year, region-year and sector-year fixed effects. The vector of controls is
the same used in column (7) of Table III. Robust standard errors clustered by industries.
V.III Robustness Checks
We perform robustness exercises in several dimensions to check the sensivity of the
results. First, we drop 5% tails of the distribution of CIP, employment, revenue and K/L
ratio, separately. Our results are virtually unchanged when we eliminate these outliers
from the estimation sample. Second, we construct a similar instrumental variable
but considering different set of countries: OECD, G7, Latin America and Mercosur
member states. None of our results change when we instrument CIP with the China’s
average industry imports share for these different groups of countries. Third, results
are robust to use a non-normalized firm-level TFP or to normalize TFP with sector
averages instead of 2 digit industry averages. Also, results are robust to using labor
productivity (revenue per worker) instead of TFP as a measure of firm productivity.
Finally, our results also remain virtually unchanged if we estimate them for the full
sample. Remember that our sample contains 78 out of 111 industries which represent
about two thirds of total manufacturing employment and revenue. Naturally, we can
not include some of the key control variables such us capital intensity or TFP, because
we lack the key variables for some of these firms.
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VI Conclusion
This paper has offered substantial evidence that there are considerable short-term
firm-level costs of adjustment in the face of a trade induced competitive shock.
Particularly, it has shown robust evidence that these costs are unevenly distributed
across firms, being the less productive firms the ones that suffered the most.
Using a panel of Chilean manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2006, we found
that firms belonging to industries more exposed to growing Chinese import penetration
dismissed more workers, reduced their sales and faced a higher probability of exiting
the market than comparable firms in less exposed industries.
There is considerable heterogeneity across firms in the adjustment to Chinese
import competition. Firms with higher initial productivity levels were better able to
withstand this competitive shock. These results are consistent with the idea that more
productive firms can escape competition from low-wage countries because they produce
higher quality products that do not compete directly with products imported from these
countries.
Our findings are especially relevant for developing countries with visible problems
of unemployment or missalocation of productive factors, where an important share of
the labor force is employed in low-competitive sectors characterized by relatively high
presence of low-productivity firms.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
China import pen. -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Other import pen. -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Avg. TFP 0.165** 0.165** 0.097
(0.065) (0.065) (0.069)






N 936 936 936 936 936
Industries 78 78 78 78 78
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY ESTIMATES FOR EMPLOYMENT, 1996-2005
2SLS
Notes. Dependent variable is the log quantity of total workers within an industry. Chinese import penetration
measured as total value of imports from China divided by domestic absorption (production minus net exports) and
varies at industry-year level. This variable is instrumented with the average Chinese industry import shares across a
subset of high-income countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and
Switzerland). Industries defined at 4 digits ISIC Rev. 3. Other import pen. measured as total value of non-China
imports divided by domestic absorption. TFP measured following Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015). Importing
(exporting) means exports (imports) >0. Regions are the country's first-level administrative division. Industries are





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
China import pen. -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Other import pen. -0.010** -0.010** -0.007* -0.008** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. TFP 0.618*** 0.611*** 0.570***
(0.120) (0.109) (0.112)






N 936 936 936 936 936
Industries 78 78 78 78 78
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE, 1996-2005
2SLS
Notes. Dependent variable is the log quantity of total workers within an industry. Chinese import
penetration measured as total value of imports from China divided by domestic absorption (production
minus net exports) and varies at industry-year level. This variable is instrumented with the average
Chinese industry import shares across a subset of high-income countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland). Industries defined at 4 digits ISIC Rev. 3. Other
import pen. measured as total value of non-China imports divided by domestic absorption. TFP measured
following Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015). Importing (exporting) means exports (imports) >0. Regions
are the country's first-level administrative division. Industries are grouped into 10 broad manufacturing




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
China import pen. -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Other import pen. -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Avg. TFP -0.150* -0.149* -0.106
(0.080) (0.080) (0.093)






N 936 936 936 936 936
Industries 78 78 78 78 78
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY ESTIMATES FOR NUMBER OF FIRMS, 1996-2005
2SLS
Notes. Dependent variable is the log quantity of firms within an industry. Chinese import penetration measured as
total value of imports from China divided by domestic absorption (production minus net exports) and varies at
industry-year level. This variable is instrumented with the average Chinese industry import shares across a subset
of high-income countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland).
Industries defined at 4 digits ISIC Rev. 3. Other import pen. measured as total value of non-China imports divided
by domestic absorption. TFP measured following Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015). Importing (exporting) means
exports (imports) >0. Regions are the country's first-level administrative division. Industries are grouped into 10
broad manufacturing sectors.  Robust standard errors clustered by industries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
TABLE AIII
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